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POLISH BORDER ISSUE HIGHLIGHTS STATE OF U. S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

THE statement made by Secretary of State Marshall in Moscow on April 9 concerning the Polish-German boundary raised one of the most explosive issues of the German peace settlement. All the Big Four agree on one point, already settled at Yalta in February 1945—that Poland should receive territory in the north and west from Germany as compensation for Polish territory acquired by the Soviet Union in 1939 east of the Curzon Line. Where they differ is on the extent of German territory that should be ceded to Poland. Controversy on this point hinges on interpretation of the arrangements made at Potsdam in July 1945 pending a final peace conference.

POLAND'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.

Poland's right to obtain territorial compensation from Germany for the loss of Eastern Poland was firmly supported by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons on February 27, 1945, and by President Roosevelt in his last address to Congress on March 1, 1945. Mr. Churchill, in his speech, backed Russia's claim to the Curzon Line which, Mr. Roosevelt pointed out, had been recognized by the Allies in 1919 as "a fair boundary" between Russia and Poland. As to Poland's western border, both Allied leaders stressed that the Yalta agreement, in Roosevelt's words, provided that "the limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final peace conference."

At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 the United States, Britain and Russia consulted representatives of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity with regard "to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive." In the declaration issued at the close of the conference, Truman, Attlee and Stalin reaffirmed their opinion "that the final delimitation of the

western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement." It was also agreed that, "pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free City of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation."

"DELIMITATION" AND "DETERMINATION." In interpreting the above provisions, the United States and Britain have taken the view that the question of the actual amount of German territory to be included in the boundaries of the new Poland was left for settlement at the peace conference, and that the areas assigned to Poland were assigned not permanently, but as a zone of occupation, pending a permanent "final determination" of Poland's western frontier. Poland and Russia have taken the view that the phrase "final delimitation" meant merely the technical fixing of the actual frontier, not reconsideration of the extent of the territory to be transferred to Poland. On the basis of this assumption, Poland proceeded to expel the German inhabitants from the area under its administration, and to replace them with Polish settlers, many of whom had themselves been evacuated from Eastern Poland, now incorporated into the U.S.S.R. The transfer of Germans had been sanctioned at Potsdam, where the Big Three recognized that the trans-

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fer to Germany "of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken," with the proviso that "any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner." The population of the German areas now under Polish administration was estimated in 1939 at 9.1 million. Many Germans left this area in the wake of the Nazi retreat and several million were expelled by the Poles following Germany's surrender. By January 1, 1947 the number of Germans in the area under Polish administration was estimated at 588,000 and the number of Poles in that area at 4,392,000. It was expected that another million Poles would be moved in during 1947, making the total population of the new territories some 6 million. Polish transfers of Germans have been severely criticized by some Western observers on the ground that the evacuees were subjected to harsh treatment by the Poles. Polish spokesmen, in reply, contend that the treatment accorded the Germans was far more humane than that meted out by the Germans to the Poles.

MARSHALL'S PROPOSALS. What Secretary of State Marshall now proposes is that southern East Prussia, primarily an agricultural area, and Upper Silesia, with its complex of coal mines and industries, should become a permanent part of Poland's territory. Economic arrangements, however, should be made, he said, "to assure that such raw materials and heavy industrial resources of the area in question as are vital to the European economy shall fairly serve that need, particularly the need of Poland." Division of the remaining German territory now under Polish administration, which is largely agricultural, requires, in Marshall's opinion, "consideration of the needs of the Polish and German peoples and of Europe as a whole." He therefore proposed the appointment by the Council of Foreign Ministers of a Special Boundary Commission composed of representatives of the Big Four, Poland, "and a convenient number of other Allied states" to be designated by the Council. The commission would be instructed "to inquire into and report upon Polish resettlement and German settlement in the areas in question and the best means to assure effective utilization of such areas for the economic well-being of the Polish and German peoples and of Europe as a whole." Secretary Marshall has thus emphasized that settlement of the Polish-German boundary should take into account not merely the interests of Poland or Germany, but of the entire continent of Europe.

Several considerations are at stake in the United States proposals, which are supported by Britain. First, as pointed out by Marshall, one-fifth of the

total food consumed by Germany before the war came from the German area now under Polish administration, while another one-fifth was supplied by imports. This means that if Poland remains in control of the entire area and retains the produce for its own needs, Germany will have to import two-fifths of its food from abroad, and will then have to undertake even more intensive industrialization than before the war. It is not clear, however, whether the German lands Marshall wants returned to Germany would furnish the one-fifth previously supplied by its eastern territories. Second, the concentration of approximately six million Germans evacuated from the east might—and of this France has been particularly fearful—create an explosive situation in Germany, and possibly cause the Germans to become increasingly militant in Western Europe. Third, the Western powers do not believe that Poland, whose population was reduced by German conquest and transfer of Eastern Poland to Russia from 32 million in 1939 to about 24 million today* has either the manpower, the agricultural "know-how," or the technical equipment to cultivate the German farmlands as effectively as was done—and, it is contended, could again be done—by the Germans, and that therefore Polish possession of these farmlands will merely intensify the impoverishment not only of Germany but of Europe as a whole. Fourth, it is feared that the cession to Poland "of areas long German will of necessity create some irredentist feeling." (This argument was made by a number of international experts in 1945, but was then brushed aside by Mr. Churchill who denied that the transfer of German territories to Poland "will bring about another revenge, or that it will—to use a conventional phrase—lay the seed of future wars.")

POLAND'S REACTION. From the point of view of Poland the Anglo-American proposals represent an attempt to undo a settlement the Poles had regarded as final except for detailed drawing of the actual boundary. The Poles admit that, owing to German destruction in Poland, and loss of the country's limited technical personnel, as well as shortage of draught-animals, it has proved extremely difficult to provide the new Polish settlers in the German farmlands with adequate food, consumer goods, and agricultural equipment. Moreover, the transfer of populations has inevitably disrupted agricultural production, with the result that Poland is facing a shortage of bread grain estimated by UNRRA at 950,000 tons. Western experts who have recently visited Poland believe, however, that with the crop of 1947 Poland will pass its present cereal

*Several readers of the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* have called attention to a typographical error in the January 31 issue, which gave the population of Poland as 45 million.

crisis. Meanwhile, under its Three-Year Plan of economic development, Poland is attempting to begin a shift from a predominantly agrarian economy by industrialization, and in the industrial field has achieved a measure of reconstruction which American observers regard as remarkable in view of the country's wartime devastation. Available figures indicate that by the end of 1946 the level of industrial production was about 70 per cent of pre-war within the present territories of Poland. For many branches of industry production was above the level of production in pre-war Poland.

It should be borne in mind that the Poles, irrespective of political affiliation, were shocked by the loss of Eastern Poland—not because of its economic resources, but primarily because of the historical significance of this area, especially the city of Lwow. Many of them had not been particularly enthusiastic about the acquisition of German territories, realizing that it would create many problems, and increase Poland's dependence on Russia for protection against German resurgence. But, since there is no hope of recovering Eastern Poland, revision of the western

boundary appears to many Poles as another blow at the Polish nation, still in the throes of recovering from years of war and civil strife.

For the Big Four the Polish boundary is a major test in the present contest for German support. Russia had gained some prestige in Germany by urging a unitary state, demanded by all German political parties, but had lost ground by claiming reparations out of current production in the western zone. Now the United States and Britain stand to gain by supporting the German desire for return of eastern territories, especially since French backing for their plans is assured by American agreement for inclusion of the Saar in France. Russia, meanwhile, risks either the loss of German sympathy if it continues to back the Poles, or alienation of the Poles by acquiescing in Marshall's proposals. Fundamentally, however, the controversy concerning the Polish boundary is only a facet of the global conflict of interests between the United States and Russia; and Poland, as so often in its history, is again the object of the clashing aspirations of rival great powers.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

F. P. A. BOOKSHELF

Divided India, by Robert A. Smith. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1947. \$3.00

A survey of India's problems, pointing up the many overwhelming issues facing the Indians on the eve of complete freedom from Britain. The background of the present Hindu-Moslem dispute is set forth in detail, and the British May 1946 proposals for independence are analyzed. Mr. Smith has been in the *New York Times* Foreign News Department since 1938, except for wartime duty with the OWI in India.

Seen from E.A., by Herbert Feis. New York, Knopf, 1947. \$2.75

The author, who was an economic adviser in the State Department from 1931 to 1944, discusses three economic problems that confronted policy-makers before Pearl Harbor: the rubber supply, oil of the Middle East, and economic sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian crisis of 1935-36. The book is highly informative and the style sprightly. Students of international economics will find it indispensable, and will hope for further installments.

Arsenal of Democracy, by Donald M. Nelson. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1946. \$4.00

This book contains much factual data on the American economy during the war. The author's discussion of the cleavage between the War Production Board, which he headed, and the Army Service of Supply in regard to control over the civilian economy throws further light on a controversy that will undoubtedly be the subject of later study.

Frontiers, Peace Treaties, and International Organization, by Brig.-Gen. Sir Osborne Mance. New York, Oxford University Press, 1946. \$3.00

This is the last in a series of seven volumes on the general subject of international transport and communications, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. The present volume includes a summary of conclusions reached in the previous studies.

With Firmness in the Right—American Diplomatic Action Affecting Jews, 1840-1945, by Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith. New York, The American Jewish Committee, 1946. \$4.00

A study in diplomatic history showing that intervention on behalf of the Jews has been practiced by the United States for more than a century. Of particular interest is an 1893 report from St. Petersburg by American Minister Andrew D. White on the Jewish situation in Russia.

French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation, by Henry W. Ehrmann. New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. \$4.00

A study of organized labor in France from the days of the Popular Front to the liberation from German occupation. It is also good historical background for the social and economic crisis of that period.

For FPA Publications of Current Interest read—

FOREIGN TRADE POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES

By Harold H. Hutcheson

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

By Vera Micheles Dean

THE RUHR: OBJECT OF ALLIED RIVALRIES

By Winifred N. Hadsel

25 cents each


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Washington News Letter



HOW VALID ARE BASIC PREMISES OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA?

Russia dominates the thoughts and actions of all who make and execute foreign policy in Washington. Their central problem is to measure Russian strength, intentions, motives, and objectives correctly—a perplexing task because intelligence about Russia is contradictory and forecasts about the reactions of a foreign government to any action suggested but not yet taken are always uncertain guesses. Since the United States policy toward Greece and Turkey which President Truman proposed on March 12 is above all a policy with respect to Russia, its effectiveness will depend on the soundness of the estimate of Russian policy which has inspired it. Since Americans have many attitudes about Russia, is the Administration's attitude the accurate one? A foreign policy based on error of judgment in this period of tense relations between the two major powers of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, could bring appalling consequences. This somber realization should encourage all Americans in official and private life to study Russia with less emotion.

PREMISES OF THE ADMINISTRATION. The official view of Russia is not fixed. The publication on April 10 of the *Wartime Correspondence between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII* discloses how greatly the executive branch of the Federal government has changed its attitude in a few years. "The only weapon which the Russian dictatorship uses outside its own borders is communist propaganda," Roosevelt wrote on September 3, 1941, and he kept this tolerant, unfrightened attitude even into 1945. Now, however, President Roosevelt's successor sees the spread of communism abroad by propaganda or other means as a menace which the United States must—and can—repel. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson on March 21 told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that this country would be in danger should Communists control the governments of Greece and Turkey, and he left the impression that Communists might control those governments if we did not act.

The Administration apparently is resting its Greek and Turkish policy on a three-fold premise: (1) that Russia's intentions toward the United States are unfriendly (although not warlike) and that the Russian government uses Communists as its agents in foreign countries, including Greece, in order to attack the interests of the United States; (2) that while Soviet foreign policy is "expansive," as Acheson phrased it in testimony before the Joint Congress-

sional Committee on Atomic Energy, Russia nevertheless suffers from domestic weakness as a result of World War II, shown in loss of industrial and agricultural productive capacity; and (3) that a show of determination by a strong United States in such a military-economic program as the Greek and Turkish policy will be sufficient to halt the expansion of which Acheson spoke and to discourage Communists in countries beyond Greece from seeking positions of power in the governments of those countries.

OPINION VARIES. Congress probably will soon approve the program for Greece and Turkey. Yet opinion about Russia is so divided that within the State Department itself some officials dispute at least one of the premises. These men believe that Russia gave up its expansive policy sometime last year, that it has gone as far as it has meant to go, although Senator Walter George, Democrat of Georgia, reflecting the controlling opinion in the Administration, said on April 4 that "if unchecked, Russia will inevitably overrun Europe, extend herself into Asia and perhaps South America."

The exponents of three other distinct points of view in the United States, each of them represented somewhere within the Administration, disagree with one or more of the official premises, all three of which are basic to the policy. The most extreme attitude calls for the United States to check Russia by military attack instead of by our present oblique diplomatic method; George H. Earle, former United States Minister to Bulgaria, a leader in this field of opinion, has proposed the dropping of atomic bombs on Russia. Isolationists, represented in the Senate by Republicans Hugh Butler, of Nebraska, and Harlan J. Bushfield, of South Dakota, while hating Communists refuse to believe that Communist governments or blocs in Russia or elsewhere in Europe threaten the interests of the United States. Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, now touring Europe, has a more affirmative attitude of tolerance toward Russia. He believes that Russia means well toward the United States but fears us. Wallace feels that, whereas the United States could attract positive demonstrations of Russian friendship by patience and gentle diplomacy, our government instead both strengthens Russian fears and bolsters Soviet influence abroad by dealing Metternich-like with illiberal governments and cliques in Europe, which stress hostility to the U.S.S.R. before all other political ideas.

BLAIR BOLLES